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Memorandum for Holders
USIB-D-39.7/22
23 August 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-39.7/22

SUBJECT : Committee on Documentation Report of
Task Team VII (Analyst Communication)

REFERENCE : USIB-D-39.7/22, 7 August 1967

1. In response to the action requested in paragraph 3 of the reference, all USIB Members have concurred in the Recommendations in Section D of the CODIB report subject to the deletion of the word "voice" in line 4 of Recommendation 2 as proposed by the CIA Member of USIB.
2. The DIA Member concurred subject to the addition of the Navy as well as the Army in the footnote on page 2 of the memorandum from the Chairman, CODIB. The FBI Member concurred with the following comment:

"With regard to recommendation Number Three, the FBI will make available identities of personnel and other information as needed by analysts."
3. Revised pages 2 and 5 incorporating the above mentioned amendments are attached for substitution in all copies of the reference document.
4. Accordingly, the Recommendations in Section D of the revised page 5 attached hereto as approved by the USIB on 22 August 1967 are circulated herewith for the information and guidance of member agencies.

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Executive Secretary

Attachment

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had been presumed when the team was organized, there remains room for improvement. Analysts in one agency communicate with analysts in another agency for two major purposes: (a) to exchange views and judgments and (b) to obtain information. Such communication is not generally undertaken to avoid duplication of effort. Although present facilities and procedures enable an analyst in one agency to identify and make contact with analysts in another agency, there are many inadequacies, and the cumulative effect of these is a definite impediment to useful analyst-to-analyst communication. The only communication system fully accessible to all analysts is the black, insecure telephone. While it should not be used for classified discussions or to transmit classified information, the task team reported that it is widely and extensively used to discuss classified matters.*

The NSA secure telephone (gray phone) system is available only to analysts with special clearance, which many in DIA and State do not have. The instruments are located only in restricted areas, in many cases remote from a large number of analysts who do have the proper clearance. Furthermore, the gray phone system should be used only to discuss SIGINT materials. Expansion of this system would be both expensive and difficult and is not planned at present. Teletype and LDX (Long Distance Xerography) are available to a limited extent but use of these mechanisms is time-consuming and cumbersome, and the analysts must leave their desks and files in order to use them. Just at the time a particular analyst needs to communicate with another the equipment may be engaged in priority communications. Furthermore, DIA is not yet in the LDX network.

The KY-3 (green) phone system, in use now and being expanded for secure voice communication between key offices in the Washington area (i.e., White House, State, DoD and CIA), offers considerable promise for alleviating the present deficiency in facilities for analyst-to-analyst secure communication. The KY-3 system will connect at the Pentagon with the worldwide Automatic Secure Voice Communications system (AUTOSEVOCOM) which also uses KY-3 terminals in the Washington area. Out-of-town offices on the AUTOSEVOCOM net will generally use a narrow band HY-2 terminal, but clusters of out-of-town subscribers may also use KY-3's to converse with each other because of better voice quality on KY-3's. There are now about 100 KY-3 terminals in CIA, 30 in State,

*The Army and Navy have no basis for supporting this statement in that the Army and Navy did not participate as members of Task Team VII and their analysts were not queried concerning use of insecure phones for discussion of classified matters.

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develop equipment and techniques for secure transmission of video signals over lines used for commercial TV. The prototype equipment and techniques have been developed and tested and are operationally satisfactory. The cost at the present time is rather high, on the order of \$1 million per pair of terminals. We have asked the Army Electronics Command and the Defense Communications Agency to keep us informed of further developments and/or plans for installation of any secure video systems. We will examine these to see whether they might be used or extended into appropriate areas to enhance analyst-to-analyst communications.

D. Recommendations.

We recommend that USIB:

1. Request its member agencies participating in the KY-3 (green) secure voice communications system in the Washington area to examine the locations of existing and planned KY-3 terminals and, wherever warranted and feasible, add a call box and extend the additional telephone lines thus provided into appropriate areas so as to improve analyst-to-analyst communications capabilities between buildings and agencies, and that they give this matter priority attention so as to alleviate as soon as possible the current situation in which the commercial telephone system is the only one available to a large percentage of the analysts.
2. Request the member agencies to assure continuing participation by managers of the major analysis organizations in the planning activities of those people concerned with the development and installation of secure communications equipment and systems so that analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities may be improved in the future to the maximum feasible extent.
3. Endorse the principle that the liaison staffs of the various agencies should be permitted to obtain and have available such telephone directories, organizational charts, listings of key personnel and handbooks as are needed to assist those analysts whom they serve in identifying appropriate analysts and sources of information in the other agencies.
4. Note the attached report of CODIB Task Team VII.

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Chairman

Attachment:

CODIB-D-111/1.7/5

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Remarks:

Dr. Sweeney did not know
that USIB had approved the Task
Team VII Report when he wrote the
attached. (USIB approval was on
22 Aug) I called him on 25 Aug
after I received the attached copy -

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